

**ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY**

18 February 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DDA Emergency Planning Committee

FROM:

Chief, Plans and Programs Staff, OL

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SUBJECT: Self critique of OL response during the snow emergency of 11 February - 14 February 1983

1. The Office of Logistics (OL) has the responsibility to plan for and provide logistical support to all Agency activities. This responsibility includes: mail and courier systems; interagency transportation system; and other appropriate logistical services during adverse weather conditions.

2. Anticipating that the snowstorm which was forecasted to begin on 11 February would be disruptive to Agency activities, OL began implementing relevant parts of emergency operating procedures on 10 February. The following is a chronological outline of actions taken by OL prior to; during; and following the storm to insure that essential Agency activities were maintained in the Headquarters area:

10 February

- Three Motor Pool employees (one driver and two mechanics) remained on duty throughout the night to support the DDI Op Center.

11 February

- At 0100, with approximately 2 inches of snow accumulation, snow plowing operations began and all Motor Pool personnel were called and asked to report to work.
- By 0200, Motor Pool personnel began arriving and plowing operations were intensified until all available equipment was in use. The intensity of the storm and rapid rate of snow accumulation, throughout the day, limited plowing efforts to the entrance and main roadways of the compound.
- At 0600 Motor Pool drivers were being dispatched to pick up essential employees who could not otherwise

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get to work. An intensive pickup effort continued until about 0900 hours when incoming requests diminished. Motor Pool drivers continued to make periodic trips throughout the day to pickup relief personnel for the various watch stations. At 1600 hours, the Motor Pool began taking people home that had been stranded at Headquarters. This effort continued throughout the night of the 11th until noon on the 12th.

- Limited shuttle bus service to outlying buildings began on schedule on the 11th and continued until 12:00 noon. At 1030 hours, the Security Duty Officer (SDO) was informed that road and traffic conditions were such that runs could not continue and that service would be terminated around noon. When shuttle service was discontinued, buses were running 1 hour behind schedule. All those requesting transportation received it.
- Forty-six employees of the Mail and Courier Branch reported for work on the 11th. Nine remained throughout Friday night and Saturday to accomplish critical mail runs. By Sunday, the branch was back on a regular schedule. During the snow emergency period, there were no critical mail runs missed.
- The GSI Cafeteria Manager was contacted mid-morning on the 11th and arrangements were made for emergency food supplies in the cafeteria. GSI personnel served lunch in the cafeteria until 1500 hours. Leftover food from the noon meal, plus a small quantity of food that was being prepared for the evening meal was placed in cold boxes in the cafeteria. The keys to the cold boxes were turned over to the SDO. The SDO was also informed that there was a limited supply of food available in the Executive Dining Room (EDR).
- At 1000 hours, a snowplow and 7 WAE's were dispatched to [ ] Building to assist employees in removing their cars from the parking lot. The [ ] crew worked from 1100 hours until 1530 hours keeping the entrance road open and assisting employees. At 1530 hours the crew returned to Headquarters, leaving between thirty and [ ] employees who elected to remain rather than venture out in the storm. The crew returned to [ ] building at 2400 hours and worked until 0200 hours on Saturday assisting anyone who wanted to leave. At 0200 hours the crew returned to Headquarters to continue snow removal operations.
- By 1400 hours, all emergency rations stored in Headquarters had been made available to the Office of

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Communications (OC) and the SDO. All available cots and blankets were also made available to the SDO.

- Throughout the day and well into the night of the 11th, all available OL personnel continued assisting those Agency employees who wished to remove their vehicles from the compound. Snowplowing operations were still restricted to the entrance to the compound and the main roadways by the rate of snow accumulation and OL resources. Clearing operations on the parking lots did not begin until around 2100 hours when the snowfall began to subside.

### 12 February

- Kitchen personnel for the Executive Dining Room (EDR) were picked up and brought in to prepare breakfast and lunch. The SDO and Logistics Duty Officer (LDO) were informed that the EDR would be open and meals would be prepared as long as the food supplies lasted. Meals were prepared for everyone who made their way to the dining room, a total of 34 people.
- GSA began participating in the snow removal effort at Headquarters at 0800 hours when three people arrived. The remainder of the GSA work force arrived at 1130 hours but were able support OL efforts only in an indirect manner by clearing sidewalks and walkways. GSA equipment stored on the compound was not operational and much of it required maintenance by OL personnel to keep it operating.
- Snow removal continued throughout the day at Headquarters.

### 13 February

- Snow removal continued at Headquarters.
- The Chief, Logistics Services Division (LSD), OL visited [ ] Building. Observing that [ ] Building parking lot was in good shape, but that the [ ] Building landlord had not responded and parking there would be very limited on Monday, arrangements were made for [ ] employees to park at [ ] Building. Shuttle bus service from [ ] was increased on Monday by operating the shuttle on an immediate turnaround basis. One-hundred employees were transported on the [ ] shuttle on Monday. STAT
- Late in the day TSD reported that no snow had been removed from the roads or parking areas around [ ] Building. STAT

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- A snowplow and crew were dispatched to [redacted] early on the 14th. Arriving there, the crew was unable to get the snowplow into the compound. One entrance had been blocked by snow [redacted]

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3. In spite of the dedication and stamina shown by many individuals throughout the entire emergency period, there were several organizational as well as some minor logistical failures which need to be addressed.

4. The most significant and widely recognized problem was the lack of coordination between Directorates, or for that matter, between components within the DDA. There was no real coordinated snow emergency plan for the Agency. Each component operated in accord with its own procedures, sometime in conflict with the procedures of others. There seemed to be a general feeling of uncertainty among those stranded in Headquarters relative to where, or to who they should go to for help. Some people, after attempting to leave and then returning to seek assistance, were directed to the DDI OP Center by FPO's. The OP Center was receiving phone calls for information on food, transportation, etc., and attempting to refer callers to an appropriate component watch. The G.W. Parkway exit from the compound was closed during the evening of the 11th, eventhough the parkway was in much better shape than Route 123. A coordinated emergency plan for the Agency would have eliminated these problems as well as a number of others, and enhanced the efficiency of all during this period.

5. In addition to the need for a coordinated emergency plan, there is also a need for a DDA Emergency coordinator. One individual, responsible for balancing Agency support resources against support requirements during an emergency situation. This individual would be the single contact (focal point) within the Directorate, insuring that component activities did not conflict with each other and that the personal needs of employees were properly addressed.

6. A less serious situation, but one that has drawn a lot of attention because it had the potential for becoming serious, was the short supply of emergency rations, blankets, and cots in the Headquarters Building. An inventory of these items just prior to the snowstorm revealed that there were 72 blankets; 164

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cots; and 180 individual rations in emergency storage. These supplies were quickly consumed by OC personnel and the 350 to 400 people stranded in the building. Fortunately, there was a sufficient supply of food available in the GSI cafeteria, and the heat was maintained in the building. At a minimum, the supply of these items should be increased to accomodate 400 to 500 people for as long as two days. In addition, serious consideration must be given to providing emergency food, medical supplies, and personal comfort items (cots, blankets, etc.) for all outlying buildings.

7. Given the resource constraints and severe weather conditions, snow removal operations went very well both during and following the storm. By Monday morning, all Agency facilities except [redacted] Building compound and the [redacted] Building parking lot were sufficiently clear of snow to provide adequate parking. In both of these locations, the responsibility for snow removal belonged to a second party; GSA at [redacted] Building; and [redacted] Building. Aside from the Agency assuming the responsibility for snow removal at [redacted] from GSA, as has been the case at the Headquarters Building, there is very little that can be done to prevent that situation from reoccurring. The [redacted] problem will require further study before options can be developed and explored.

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#### 8. Other issues:

##### - Opening of the Executive Dining Room

Because there was a limited amount of food available in the EDR, a decision was made to inform only the SDO and LDO. At the time, no one in OL was aware of the number of people stranded in the building (another problem that would have been eliminated by a DDA emergency coordinator).

##### - To-and-from-work transportation for essential employees

The capability and overall effectiveness of the Motor Pool was greatly reduced by the distance traveled to pickup and return essential employees. Trips were made to areas as far away as Centreville, VA., and Bethesda, MD. When possible, the distance an employee lives from Headquarters should be considered when developing essential personnel rosters.

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9. Given the magnitude of the 11 February snowstorm and the demands placed on OL's limited resources to deal with an emergency of this nature, I can find no basis for any severe criticism. Certainly there should not be any for the individuals, especially those in LSD who came in during the peak of the storm, stayed throughout the night of the 11th, and in many cases the entire weekend to insure that the Agency could continue to function effectively. According to some, it was the best effort in the history of the Agency

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